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Abstract
Purpose To train a cycle-consistent generative adversarial
network (CycleGAN) on mammographic data to inject or re-
move features of malignancy, and to determine whether these
AI-mediated attacks can be detected by radiologists.
Material and Methods From the two publicly available
datasets, BCDR and INbreast, we selected images from can-
cer patients and healthy controls. An internal dataset served
as test data, withheld during training. We ran two experi-
ments training CycleGAN on low and higher resolution im-
ages (256×256 px and 512×408 px). Three radiologists read
the images and rated the likelihood of malignancy on a scale
from 1–5 and the likelihood of the image being manipulated.
The readout was evaluated by ROC analysis (Area under the
ROC curve = AUC).
Results At the lower resolution, only one radiologist exhib-
ited markedly lower detection of cancer (AUC=0.85 vs 0.63,
p=0.06), while the other two were unaffected (0.67 vs. 0.69
and 0.75 vs. 0.77, p=0.55). Only one radiologist could dis-
criminate between original and modified images slightly bet-
ter than guessing/chance (0.66, p=0.008). At the higher res-
olution, all radiologists showed significantly lower detection
rate of cancer in the modified images (0.77–0.84 vs. 0.59–
0.69, p=0.008), however, they were now able to reliably de-
tect modified images due to better visibility of artifacts (0.92,
0.92 and 0.97).
Conclusion A CycleGAN can implicitly learn malignant
features and inject or remove them so that a substantial pro-
portion of small mammographic images would consequently
be misdiagnosed. At higher resolutions, however, the method
is currently limited and has a clear trade-off between manip-
ulation of images and introduction of artifacts.
∗Correspondence to: Anton S. Becker, Institute of Diagnostic
and Interventional Radiology, University Hospital Zurich, Raemis-
trasse 100, CH-8091 Zurich, E-Mail: anton.becker@usz.ch
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Introduction
Machine learning (ML) in medical imaging is a promising
field of research, which will bring substantial changes to
radiology in the coming years. Mammography, as a 2D x-
ray projection modality with great clinical significance, is
arguably one of the first fields where these techniques will
be successfully deployed. Many ML studies focus on (semi)
automated detection [1] or classification of cancer [2]. How-
ever, there is also a considerable number of studies focusing
on radiation dose reduction e.g. by reconstructing images
from the raw data through ML algorithms [3] or working
directly with ultralow-dose data [4]. In mammography, this
would be of great benefit for all patients, and in particular
for young women who are more vulnerable to the effects of
ionizing radiation. First ML algorithms in CT are already
applied in the clinical routine, autonomously optimizing pa-
tient table positioning and thus reducing the applied radia-
tion dose [5]. Most advanced ML algorithms are fundamen-
tally opaque and as they, inevitably, find their way onto med-
ical imaging devices and clinical workstations, we need to be
aware that they may also be used to manipulate raw data and
enable new ways of cyber-attacks, possibly harming patients
and disrupting clinical imaging service [6].
One specific genre of ML algorithms, Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs), are of particular importance in this
context. GANs are a subclass of deep learning algorithms,
itself a class of algorithms within the realm of ML or artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) [7]. A GAN consists of two neural net-
works competing against each other: The first, generator net-
work (G), manipulates sample images and the second, dis-
criminator network (D), has to distinguish between real and
manipulated samples [8]. Due to their opposed cost func-
tion, the neural networks are competing against each other
in order to improve their performance (in game theory this
scenario is known as a “two person zero-sum game” [9]).
Given infinite resources and time, this will theoretically re-
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sult in G producing samples from the real image distribution
(i.e. perfect manipulations) and D completely incapable of
discriminating, giving each such sample a probability of 0.5
for being either manipulated or real. In our case, we hypoth-
esized that a GAN can learn an implicit representation of
what cancer in mammography looks like, and specifically al-
ter images, so they would be misdiagnosed (healthy as can-
cerous and vice versa) while even a radiologist could not
differentiate between manipulated images and real ones.
Hence, the purpose of this study was to train a pair of
GANs on mammographic data to inject or remove features
of malignancy and to determine whether these AI-mediated
attacks can be detected by radiologists.
Methods
Patient Cohorts/Datasets
From two publicly available datasets, BCDR [10] and IN-
breast [11], 680 mammographic images from 334 patients
were selected, 318 of which exhibited potentially cancer-
ous masses, and 362 were healthy controls. We used all IN-
BREAST cases with BI-RADS 3 or greater as cancer cases,
and all cases with a focal lesion and marked as “malignant”
from BCDR. As an additional test dataset for experiment
two (see below), we used images from a private dataset pre-
viously published in [1] (302 cancer / 590 healthy). These
images were withheld from the network during training and
only used to generate images for the readout and test how
well the network generalizes to new, unseen images.
GAN Model Selection and Adaptation
We view the task of injecting and removing malignant fea-
tures from an image as an image translation problem in the
spirit of the recently proposed cycle-consistent GANs model
(CycleGAN) [12], which aim to translate images from one
distribution, e.g. healthy subjects, to another distribution,
e.g. cancer patients, and back. We trained an adapted version
of CycleGAN, using two pairs of generator and discrimina-
tor networks to convert cancerous breast images to healthy
and back, and vice versa for the controls.
First Experiment The CycleGAN architecture was im-
plemented in TensorFlow v1.5 [13]. Images were rescaled
to 256× 256 px, normalized between −1 and +1, and aug-
mented tenfold by random rotation, scaling, and contrast
perturbations. The training was performed on a consumer-
grade personal computer (PC) with an Nvidia GeForce
GTX 1070 graphics processing unit (GPU). The code and
toy data for the first experiment can be found online:
github.com/BreastGAN/experiment1. It contains all the rel-
evant hyperparameters and was designed to run out-of-the-
box via Docker to facilitate reproduction and extension of
our results.
Second Experiment This experiment was designed and
conducted after the first readout in order to further test the
limits of CycleGAN. We increased the resolution of the im-
ages more than 3-fold to 512× 408 px. After an initial test-
run with satisfactory results, we decided to proceed with-
out data augmentation. Due to the increased image size, we
used a GPU cluster consisting of up to eight GeForce GTX
TITAN X/Xp GPUs. We implemented CycleGAN in Ten-
sorflow v1.12.rc2 for this experiment. The code and syn-
thetic data for the second experiment can be found online:
github.com/BreastGAN/experiment2.
Radiologist readout
First readout From the first experiment, we randomly
chose 30 modified and 30 original images, with 40 images in
pairs and 20 unpaired images (cancer vs. healthy). Only im-
ages with visible masses at this resolution were considered
from the original images from the respective category. The
images were presented to three radiologists (5 years of ex-
perience for the two senior readers, and one PGY-6 fellow)
who rated them on a 5-point Likert-like scale for the likeli-
hood of cancer (“how likely would you recall this patient”)
and had to indicate whether the image was real or gener-
ated/modified. In the first readout, this was a binary indi-
cation. The radiologists were fully blinded to the purpose of
the study and the distribution of cancer vs. healthy cases, i.e.
they were only informed that some images had been modi-
fied “by the computer”. Reference standard was the original
label/class of the image also in the GAN-modified images,
matching our scenario of the images being modified in the
background to “fool” the radiologist.
Second Readout In the second readout, the readers knew
the results of the initial readout, roughly what types of arti-
facts were to be expected, and that CycleGAN was used in
the study. During training we observed that artifacts seemed
to get more pronounced in the later training process (see re-
sults section below). To test this hypothesis, we presented
modified images generated after different number of training
iterations (35k and 70k) and let the readers rate the artificial
artifacts on a 5-point scale as well.
They were again blinded to the distribution of samples:
From step 35k we selected 6 image pairs and 6 single im-
ages (evaluation dataset used during training) to test for dif-
ferences in artifact occurrence; after training the GAN for
70k iterations we selected 12 healthy and 12 cancerous im-
ages. Half of the images were modified and half of them
were originals, and again half of them paired and the other
half unpaired, from each the evaluation and the test dataset.
Hence, the total number of images for the second readout
was 72 (36 cancer / 36 healthy).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using R v.3.4.4. (R Foun-
dation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria). Contin-
uous data was expressed as median and interquartile range
(IQR). Categorical data was given in absolute counts.
Detection accuracy was assessed with receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) analysis. ROC curves were computed
with the package pROC v.1.12.1, the discriminatory per-
formance of readers was expressed as the area under the
ROC curve (AUC). AUC were compared with DeLong’s
non-parametric test [14]. Where helpful, p-values of the
three readers were combined with the procedure proposed
by Stouffer et al. [15].
Results
First experiment
In a first experiment, we modified CycleGAN [12] to work
with small mammographic images (256× 256 px) from the
publicly available datasets BCDR [10] and INBreast [11],
running on a consumer grade PC.
Qualitatively, we noticed that at the beginning of the train-
ing, during the initial iterations, the GAN started out by first
adjusting global features like contrast/brightness and then
started removing or adding glandular tissue early on, thus
increasing the overall breast density. Later, it would pick up
skin-thickening as a malignant feature. Finally, it would ap-
ply more focal alterations like removing or adding mass-like
lesions, or morphing large, benign calcifications into fat or
soft tissue masses. In general, poorly circumscribed, ma-
lignant looking masses would be preferentially placed on
top of preexisting structures (either islets of breast tissue
or benign findings). Moreover, added focal lesions gener-
ally looked somewhat more realistic than removed ones. We
noticed that after 160k steps, grid-like or checkerboard-like
artifacts became very prominent in the generated images,
making it fairly easy for humans to spot the manipulated
images. Hence, we went back to check the images for less
pronounced artifacts and loaded the network with weights
before step 160k to generate the images for the first readout.
The code to reproduce this first experiment can be found on
github.com/BreastGAN/experiment1.
From the images generated by the network trained less
than 160k steps, we randomly chose 30 modified and 30
original images, with 40 images in pairs (i.e. the original and
GAN-modified version), and 20 unpaired images. These im-
ages were presented to 3 radiologists (in random order), who
had to rate the likelihood of malignancy on a scale from 1–5
and indicate whether the image was modified or not (binary
decision). We found that in one of the experienced radiolo-
gists, the modifications introduced by CycleGAN markedly
reduced diagnostic performance. The AUC of this reader
dropped from 0.85 to 0.63 (p=0.06) in the modified images,
with regard to the original labels/classes, while the two other
readers seemed unaffected, however, at a lower baseline per-
formance (AUC 0.75 vs. 0.77 and 0.67 vs. 0.69, p=0.55).
Only the first reader could detect the CycleGAN modifica-
tions in some images (AUC=0.66, p=0.008), whereas the
two other readers were not better than chance in this task
(AUC=0.48 and 0.50, p=0.59 and 0.50). These results are
summarized in Figure 1.
Second experiment
In the second experiment, we further investigated the oc-
currence of artifacts at later training stages and in im-
ages with a higher resolution. Since a higher resolution al-
lows for finer textures and more detail, which are essen-
tial in the clinical use of mammographies, we hypothesized
that the artifacts would be easier to spot. Therefore, we
more than tripled the working resolution of our CycleGAN
to 512 × 408 px. Due to the increased memory demand,
we ran our experiments on a dedicated GPU cluster. The
source code together with toy data is available online on
github.com/BreastGAN/experiment2. To test how well the
network generalized to new, unseen data, we used an addi-
tional, internal test dataset from a prior study [1], which was
withheld during training.
On inspection of the training monitoring, we noticed the
same learning pattern as the first time, however, the grid-
like artifacts were indeed more pronounced and seemed
to increase after around 45–50k steps of training iteration.
Hence, we selected 6 image pairs and 6 images from step
35k (evaluation dataset used during training) to test for dif-
ferences in artifact occurrence. From step 70k we selected
12 healthy and 12 cancerous images, half of them modified
and half of them originals, and half of them paired and the
other half unpaired, from each the evaluation and the test
dataset. The total number of images for the second readout
was 72 (36 healthy / 36 cancer), a representative selection of
images is shown in Figure 2.
We found that for all radiologists, the performance to dis-
criminate between healthy and cancerous (referencing the
original image class) dropped significantly (AUCs given in
Table 1 and Figure 3, p=0.008), with no significant differ-
ence between evaluation and test data (p=0.53–0.80), indi-
cating that the network generalized well to new data. How-
ever, all radiologists could now reliably identify the mod-
ified images (AUC=0.97–0.92), confirming our hypothesis
that the artifacts were easier to identify at higher resolution.
Identification of modifications was not better in images from
the later training stages (AUC early vs. late = 1.0 vs. 0.92,
0.91 vs. 0.94 and 0.93 vs. 0.93), which did not confirm our
hypothesis that the GAN would produce more artifacts at
later training stages.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether a GAN can
inject or remove malignant features in a realistic way that
would make modified images indistinguishable from real
ones even for radiologists. We found that at low and slightly
higher resolution, these features were realistic enough to
change the radiologists diagnosis from healthy to suspicious
and vice versa. While at low resolution, there were no or
very little artifacts that distinguished the modified images
from real ones, at the higher resolution these artifacts be-
came obvious to the point that the modified images were
recognized more easily. We did not find any difference in
appearance between training and test data, suggesting that
the GAN generalizes well to unseen data.
In the past decades, computers have become an integral
part of all clinical workflows in modern healthcare systems.
This brings great advantages on one hand, i.e. better docu-
mentation, more efficient workflows [16] or new discoveries
in research [17], but on the other hand, the system becomes
dependent on computers and will inevitably take over some
of their inherent weaknesses. The fact that such scenarios
are beyond hypothetical deliberations has painfully become
apparent in the recent cases where patient information in
whole hospital systems was encrypted and thus rendered in-
accessible by attackers who demanded a ransom payment
for decryption (this particular kind of attack is called “ran-
somware” [18]. Moreover, these potential threats are clearly
Figure 1: ROC curves for cancer detection in the original images (solid line), the modified images (dashed line) and the dis-
tinction between original and modified image (red line) for all three readers in the first readout (low resolution, 256 × 256
pixels).
READER AUC originals AUC modified p-value
1 0.78 0.69 0.12
2 0.77 0.59 0.10
3 0.84 0.60 0.02
READER AUC evaluation AUC test p-value
1 0.60 0.56 0.74
2 0.39 0.43 0.80
3 0.65 0.56 0.52
READER AUC late AUC early p-value
1 0.93 0.93 1.00
2 1.00 0.93 0.16
3 0.90 0.95 0.52
Table 1: Results of the ROC analysis for the second experiment. Combined p-values were 0.008 for original vs. modified, 0.81
for evaluation vs. test set and 0.79 for late vs. early training stage.
not only limited to healthcare: For example, a government
investigation concluded that in the past 2016 U.S. presiden-
tial election, cyber warfare may have played a role in sway-
ing the results in favor of a particular candidate [19].
All modalities in a modern medical imaging department
rely heavily on computers and networks, making them a
prime target for cyber-attacks [6]. As machine learning or ar-
tificial intelligence (AI) algorithms will increasingly be used
in the clinical routine, whether to reduce the radiation bur-
den by reconstructing images from low-dose raw data [3, 4]
or help diagnose diseases [1, 20, 21, 22] their widespread
implantation would also render them attractive targets for
attacks. Exploiting vulnerabilities of deep neural networks
is becoming an established field of research, yielding inter-
esting results like the “one-pixel attack” [23], where an at-
tacking neural network only modifies one pixel in order for
the image to be misclassified. Evidently though, such an at-
tack would not be able to fool a human observer. Hence,
an important aspect of GANs is that they may be able to
produce realistic examples which could mislead human ob-
servers as well as machine algorithms [24]. Regarding med-
ical imaging, we can imagine two categories of attacks: Fo-
cused and generalized attacks. In a focused attack, an algo-
rithm would be altered so it would misdiagnose a targeted
person (e.g. political candidate or company executive) in or-
der to achieve a certain goal (e.g. manipulation of election or
hostile company takeover). In a generalized attack, a great
number of devices would be infected with the malicious al-
gorithm lying dormant most of the time and stochastically
leading to a certain number of misdiagnoses, causing poten-
tially fatal outcomes for the affected patients, increased cost
for the whole healthcare system and — ultimately — un-
dermining the public’s trust in the healthcare system. At the
time of writing, however, we would argue that the technol-
ogy is not yet advanced enough to make the threat of such
an attack imminent. However, we think this matter deserves
attention and further investigation in order to secure soft-
ware/algorithms and hardware, before technology catches
up.
It is worth pointing out that there are also many other
Figure 2: Representative examples of original (left) and CycleGAN-modified images (right) from the second experiment. The
top two rows are healthy mammographies with injected malignancies, the bottom two rows are images with real cancers, which
were removed by CycleGAN. Note how in the top examples (healthy to cancer), the GAN uses existing features in the image
to modify in order to look malignant (islet of breast tissue and benign macrocalcifications, respectively).
Figure 3: ROC curves for cancer detection in the original images (solid line), the modified images (dashed line) and the distinc-
tion between original and modified image (red line) in all three readers for the second readout (higher resolution, 512 × 408
pixels). The significantly lower performance in modified images can be clearly appreciated, albeit these were easily identified
as such, as apparent by the red curve.
possible applications of GANs apart from cyber-attacks. In
a recent study, the authors investigated which features are
learned by a GAN when estimating the severity of conges-
tive heart failure in a chest x-ray examination [25]. Hence,
GANs could be used either to discover new imaging fea-
tures of a disease, for teaching purposes, or to detect biases
and confounders in training datasets. Furthermore, many
datasets, especially in a screening setting, are highly unbal-
anced, i.e. the cases of healthy individuals far outweigh the
cancer cases. GANs could be used to create more balanced
datasets and thus facilitate training of other ML algorithms.
There are several limitations that need to be mentioned.
The introduction of grid or checkerboard artifacts is a known
problem in GANs related to upsampling [26]. We attribute
the more perceptible artifacts at the higher resolution to two
reasons: First, the higher resolution allows for finer textures
and details, and thus will require more careful modifications
by the GAN in order not to distort the natural patterns oc-
curring in the fatty and dense breast tissue. Second, although
we combined two of the largest publicly available datasets,
they are still fairly small compared with datasets currently
used in computer vision research: For example, the Ima-
geNet database contains nearly 14.2 million images at the
time of writing [27]. Moreover, the average resolution of Im-
ageNet pictures is lower than the resolution used in our sec-
ond experiment. This entails a relative sparsity of the dataset
in our experiments for the task at hand [12] leading to over-
fitting and artifacts [26]. Both points are highly relevant for
mammography: Clinical mammographic images have a very
high resolution, about two orders of magnitude higher than
our experiments. For future research, much larger databases
with mammographic images will be needed.
Increasing the size of the images brings another problem
about: One of the most important bottlenecks for deep learn-
ing experiments in computer vision is memory. Tackling this
problem is non-trivial and an active field of research [28].
Hence, it is currently common practice in research to re-
size the images to a low resolution to speed up the training
process or make it feasible at all. We were left to choose
between resizing the images thus losing detail information
or working with small patches of full-resolution mammo-
graphies while losing global information. Since this was a
proof-of-principle study and we were interested in whether,
how and where a GAN would extract and insert features in
the whole image, we chose the former trade-off. Moreover, a
readout with single image patch is less representative of clin-
ical routine than small, resized versions of the whole mam-
mography.
In conclusion, we could show that a CycleGAN is capa-
ble of implicitly learning malignant features and injecting
or removing them so that a substantial proportion of small
mammographic images are consequently misdiagnosed. At
higher resolutions, however, the method is limited and cur-
rently has a clear trade-off between manipulation of images
and introduction of artifacts. Nevertheless, this matter de-
serves further study in order to shield future devices and
software from AI-mediated attacks.
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